Abstract This article provides a first analysis of the forecasts of inflation and GDP growth obtained from the Bank of England's Survey of External Forecasters, considering both the survey average forecasts published in the quarterly Inflation Report, and the individual survey responses, recently made available by the Bank. These comprise a conventional incomplete panel dataset, with an additional dimension arising from the collection of forecasts at several horizons; both point forecasts and density forecasts are collected. The inflation forecasts show good performance in tests of unbiasedness and efficiency, albeit over a relatively calm period for the UK economy, and there is considerable individual heterogeneity. For GDP growth, inaccurate real-time data and their subsequent revision are seen to cause serious difficulties for forecast construction and evaluation, although the forecasts are again unbiased. There is evidence that some forecasters have asymmetric loss functions.
Introduction
Every quarter since 1996, the Bank of England has asked a group of external forecasters for their views on some key macroeconomic indicators. Initially only forecasts of the official targeted measure of inflation were requested; subsequently questions about GDP growth, the Bank's official interest rate, and the sterling effective exchange rate index were added. In general there are three questions about each variable, relating to three different forecast horizons. Of particular interest is the collection of expectations of future inflation and GDP growth not only as point forecasts but also in the form of subjective probability distributions -so-called density forecasts. The Survey of External Forecasters (henceforth SEF) provides useful information on expectations outside the Bank about future economic developments and the likely achievement of the Bank's inflation target, which is supplied to the Bank's
Monetary Policy Committee at its quarterly forecast meetings. The Committee meets monthly, and every three months prepares a forecast and the accompanying Inflation Report.
The quarterly Inflation Report also presents aggregate results from the current SEF.
The Bank of England has recently made available the individual SEF responses, suitably anonymised, for research purposes. This new source of survey data is comparable to the well known US Survey of Professional Forecasters, hitherto the only available source of time series of density forecasts in macroeconomics. The context is slightly different, since in the UK case the survey proprietor is itself a producer of published forecasts, to which its survey makes a useful input, as described below. Nevertheless the new data offer opportunities to replicate and extend some of the studies undertaken on the US data. Our previous articles derive measures of uncertainty and disagreement from the SEF data (Boero, Smith and Wallis, 2008a) , and analyse the revision process in repeated "fixed-event"
forecasts of the same outcome (2008b). The present article provides a first analysis of the quality of the individual and aggregate point forecasts of inflation and GDP growth.
The data are described as a three-dimensional panel, following Davies and Lahiri (1995) , because in addition to the usual two dimensions of a panel data set -individuals and time periods -we have multiple forecasts, reported in successive quarterly surveys, of particular inflation and GDP growth outcomes. A further dimension arises from the implicit availability of two point forecasts, one the reported point forecast, the other implicit in a measure of location of the reported density forecast. We consider possible sources of differences between these two forecasts, and analyse the performance of both forecasts.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. The structure of the survey and its use by the Monetary Policy Committee, together with the properties of the dataset and its dual point forecasts, are described in Section 2. The econometric framework used for forecast evaluation is presented in Section 3, and the empirical results follow in the next four sections. Section 4 deals with tests of unbiasedness and summary measures of forecast performance, Section 5 explores the possibility of asymmetry in the forecasters' loss functions, Section 6 presents evidence of individual heterogeneity, and Section 7 considers tests of forecast efficiency. Section 8 concludes.
The structure and use of the Survey of External Forecasters

Survey design
The institutions covered in the survey include City firms, academic institutions and private consultancies, and are predominantly based in London. The sample changes from time to time as old respondents leave or new survey members are included, and not every institution provides a forecast to the Bank every quarter, so the panel is incomplete. Although the survey members are individually anonymous, it is reasonable to assume that, collectively, there is considerable overlap with the professional forecasters regularly covered by services such as Consensus Economics and HM Treasury's monthly compilation, Forecasts for the UK Economy.
For the first two years the survey questions related only to inflation, defined with respect to the Retail Prices Index excluding mortgage interest payments (RPIX), in terms of which the official inflation target was defined; the survey definition switched to the Fig. 1 ; the GDP growth questions have the same format. Whereas the US Survey of Professional Forecasters offers respondents a choice of level or growth rates in reporting their point forecasts, which hinders joint interpretation of point and density forecasts, here there is no ambiguity. Also the point forecast question is immediately adjacent to the density forecasts, unlike the US survey, and the use of the neutral "central projection" term makes no attempt to specify which particular measure of central tendency of the density forecast might be related to the respondent's point forecast.
Each quarterly survey since February 1998 asks for forecasts at three future points in time, as in the example in Fig. 1 : the fourth quarter (Q4) of the current year; the fourth quarter of the following year; and the corresponding quarter two years ahead. (In the early "inflation-only" surveys, only the first two questions appeared.) This structure eventually delivers nine successive forecasts of a given Q4 outcome, which form a sequence of "fixedevent" forecasts, with the date of the forecast preceding the date of the outcome by 8, 7,…, 1, 0 quarters. Given that the survey goes out early in the quarter, when no data on currentquarter inflation and GDP growth are available, we treat these as h-step-ahead forecasts with horizon h equal to 9, 8,…, 2, 1 quarters successively. In the more conventional time-series framework of constant-horizon forecasts, the third question delivers a quarterly series of nine-quarter-ahead forecasts, but the first two questions give only one observation per year at intermediate horizons, 4 h = and 8 in February, 3 h = and 7 in May, and so on. This focus on end-year targets is clearly more familiar to forecasters, since there are usually a few respondents who answer the first two questions but not the third question. Despite this, in May 2006 all three questions were switched to a constant-horizon format, focusing on the corresponding quarter one, two and three years ahead.
The Monetary Policy Committee's inflation forecasts
In an inflation targeting central bank, inflation forecasts are central to the conduct of policy, because it takes time for interest rate changes to affect inflation. "Inflation targeting implies inflation forecast targeting" (Svensson, 1997 (Svensson, , p.1113 emphasis in original) . In the United Kingdom in May 1997, the newly elected Labour Government granted operational independence to the Bank of England, through the newly created Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), to set interest rates in pursuit of an inflation target set by the Government. The MPC also assumed responsibility for the inflation forecasts previously produced by the Bank. Bean and Jenkinson (2001) describe the internal processes adopted by the MPC, covering the monthly policy round, the quarterly forecast round, and the preparation of the accompanying Inflation Report. In particular, at quarterly "draft forecast" meetings a few days before the associated MPC policy meeting, to help the MPC's overall assessment of its own forecast, a draft forecast is compared with external forecasts (2001, pp.439-440 Groen, Kapetanios and Price (2007) , who compare the MPC's forecasts to a variety of inflation forecasting models, including linear and nonlinear univariate models, and three-and five-variable VARs. This is described as a "real time" evaluation, because the estimated forecasting models are conditioned on the dataset that was available at the time the MPC's forecasts were prepared. The results, for horizons 1 h = , 4 and 8, are striking: in no case does a model outperform the MPC forecasts, in terms of out-of-sample forecast RMSE. Groen et al. attribute the relatively poor performance of the statistical inflation forecasts to the importance of the judgment exercised by the MPC. In the present context this includes judgment of the weight to be given to external forecasts, and we note the result in Section 4.4 below that the SEF average point forecast of inflation in turn outperforms the MPC's forecast, so perhaps judgment could have been further improved.
Casillas- Olvera and Bessler (2006) compare the published SEF average density forecasts two years ahead with those of the MPC, and find that the SEF does a better job than the MPC in terms of the Brier score for the inflation forecasts. 
The dataset of individual SEF responses
Comparing point forecasts and density forecast means
The SEF density forecasts are reported as histograms, with respondents supplying their probabilities that future inflation or GDP growth will fall in each of a number of pre-assigned intervals, or bins. The histograms in the SEF data have rather few bins, between four and six, with the first and last being open-ended. A given density forecast implies a point forecast, as a measure of location of the distribution, and we consider the mean, estimated by applying the standard formula, assuming that the reported probabilities are concentrated at the midpoints of the respective intervals, and that the open-ended intervals have an assumed finite width, equal to twice the width of the interior intervals. We first describe the nature of the differences between the reported point forecasts and the density forecast means, and then discuss its implications for the subsequent forecast evaluation exercises.
Summary evidence is presented in Tables 1 and 2 , which report the percentage of cases in which the point forecast deviates from the density forecast mean by more than 0.2 percentage points, first for each regular respondent, then aggregated over this subsample, and finally for the full SEF sample. The two tables deal respectively with the inflation and GDP growth forecasts. The full-sample information is also given by Boero et al. (2008a, Engelberg, Manski and Williams (2008) . These authors document the extent to which reported point forecasts in the US Survey of Professional Forecasters deviate from calculated measures of location of the reported density forecasts, and observe that in such cases, forecasters are inclined to present "favourable" scenarios, in the sense that, more often than not, their point forecasts anticipate lower inflation and higher output growth than indicated by the measures of location of their density forecasts. For the GDP growth forecasts, this tendency increases as the forecast horizon increases, which is in accordance with the finding in the literature on subjective probability judgments that optimism increases with forecast horizon (see Milburn, 1978 , for an early discussion and experimental evidence).
The full-sample SEF data in Tables 1 and 2 show a greater tendency towards similarly "favourable" scenarios in respect of GDP growth than inflation, with this again increasing as the forecast horizon (or question number) increases. However in the two-year-ahead inflation forecasts the deviations are more evenly balanced, suggesting that, in an inflation targeting regime, a favourable scenario is one in which the official target is achieved in the medium term, and this may lead to a positive or negative adjustment to an initial forecast. The aggregate data for the regular respondent subsample show the same patterns, although these data mask considerable variation across the 19 individual rows of each table. We note that the interpretation of Engelberg et al. (2008) that "forecasters who skew their point predictions tend to present rosy scenarios" implicitly uses the density forecast as the base for the comparison, whereas the SPF questionnaire first asks for point forecasts of several variables and then, on a separate page, for density forecasts of inflation and GDP growth. The SEF question shown in Fig. 1 gives less priority to one forecast or the other, and differences in forecasters' loss functions provide an alternative interpretation of the individual divergences summarised in Tables 1 and 2 .
The optimal point forecast under the conventional quadratic loss function is the mean of the density forecast, but is different from the mean under other symmetric loss functions if the density is asymmetric. For a symmetric linear loss function the optimal point forecast is the median, and for a bounded "all or nothing" loss function the optimal point forecast is the mode of the density forecast. And if the loss function is asymmetric, again the optimal point forecast differs from the density forecast mean.
Regression tests of the divergences between the reported point forecast and the density forecast mean find a highly significant negative coefficient on the skewness of the forecast density in the pooled subsample and in many individual cases, for both inflation and GDP growth. This holds in regressions with the point forecast as dependent variable, including the density forecast mean as a regressor, or with the divergence between them as dependent variable, or in an ordered probit regression based on the classification of the divergence used in Tables 1 and 2 . Recalling that positive skewness implies mean>median>mode, this result is consistent with forecasters reporting a point forecast closer to one that is optimal under some other loss function than the standard quadratic loss function, such as the two examples given above. The individual cases in which a significant negative skewness coefficient does not appear are those in which relatively few divergences greater than 0.2 ± are observed, including individuals with several zero entries in Tables 1   and 2 . These differences across individuals are suggestive of differences in their loss functions. This heterogeneity merits further investigation in its own right, and also suggests that forecast evaluation should be conducted not only in the standard framework, which is founded on squared error loss, but also in the framework proposed by Elliott, Komunjer and Timmermann (2005) , which allows more general loss functions. They find that allowing for asymmetric loss can significantly change the outcome of empirical tests of forecast rationality, and some of their procedures are included below.
The econometric framework
We adopt the notational convention of the three-dimensional panel introduced by Davies and Lahiri (1995) 
The second component th λ is common to all individual forecast errors -it has no i subscript -and it represents the cumulative effect on t A of uncorrelated period-by-period aggregate shocks since the forecast was made. The first and third components of the forecast error are specific to individual forecasters, separating a possible systematic effect or individual bias i φ from an idiosyncratic non-autocorrelated error, ith ε , which might reflect individual sentiment or "animal spirits", and mishandling of or inadequacies in the initial information set. The extension by Davies (2006) relaxes the assumption that the individual forecaster's bias i φ is independent of the forecast horizon h, so the decomposition becomes t ith ih th ith A F
General expressions for estimates of the forecast error components in equation (1) are 
In the extended decomposition of equation (2), estimates of the horizon-specific individual biases are
If the number of point forecast errors were the same for all horizons, as is implicit in the above definition, then equation (3) would give
This does not hold in the SEF dataset by virtue of the structure of the questions, irrespective of additional complications caused by missing observations. To represent the SEF structure described above we distinguish between the quarters, 1,..., 4 q = , by writing the time index as
indicates the year, so that the specific form of equation (3) is ( ) ( )
′ with a corresponding specialisation of equation (6).
Tests of unbiasedness and efficiency of forecasts under squared error loss can be based on regressions of observed forecast errors on various regressors. The simplest is the test of the null hypothesis of zero mean forecast error, or unbiasedness of individual forecasts, and the estimate ˆi φ in equation (3) is equal to the coefficient in a regression of the forecast error on an intercept term. Tests of efficiency or rationality check for the absence of a correlation between the forecast error and information available at time t h − by regressing the error on candidate variables from this information set, which may include previous forecast errors.
The regression context is convenient for considering questions of inference, in particular the calculation of the relevant forecast error covariance matrix, denoted Σ , and associated regression coefficient covariance matrices, given as ( ) ( ) 
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They develop expressions for the NTH NTH ×
covariance matrix Σ and its estimation, with an extension (1995, §5) to accommodate observed heteroskedasticity. These can be readily adapted to the structure of the SEF described above. Missing data are handled by appropriately compressing the data and covariance matrices (Davies and Lahiri, 1995, p.213 ).
Unbiasedness tests and forecast RMSEs
Point forecasts
Analyses of each regular respondent's point forecast errors are summarised in Tables 3 and 4 . These series are never revised after first publication. Table 4 contains results for GDP growth, first using real-time data as actual outcome data to define the forecast errors, and then replacing these by revised ("historical") data, as of the August 2007 issue of Economic Trends. In all cases the outcome data extend to 2005Q4, so the summary statistics in the two panels of Table 4 include the contribution of very recent forecast errors which are defined with respect to outcome data which are, as yet, relatively similar. The maximum possible number of inflation forecasts is 98, supplied by only one forecaster, as noted above, and of GDP growth forecasts is 84.
Columns 2-6 of the tables report the root mean squared forecast error (RMSE), the variance 2 i ε σ of the idiosyncratic errors estimated as in equation (5), the individual bias ˆi φ given in equation (3), its standard error calculated from the appropriate covariance matrix, and the resulting t-ratio. The significance of the t-test of the null hypothesis of zero individual bias at the 10, 5 or 1 percent level is indicated by one, two or three asterisks respectively.
Inflation The mean forecast error is negative for 13 of the 19 regular respondents, indicating a general tendency to overpredict inflation. The mean error is significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level in two cases, both being cases of a significant negative bias. The larger of these, and the largest absolute bias overall, is approximately a quarter of one percentage point. Although this is statistically significant, in practical terms it is small, compared to the average outcome of 2.5% for RPIX inflation (which is exactly equal to the target value) and the deviation of 1 ± percentage point from target that triggers the requirement of a public explanation by the Governor of the Bank of England. (The range of the quarterly observations of the annual RPIX inflation rate is 1.9-3.2%.)
GDP growth The upper panel of Table 4 is based on GDP growth forecast errors defined with reference to real-time data on the actual outcomes. These show a more pronounced tendency towards overprediction than the inflation forecast errors, with negative mean forecast errors for all but two of the regular respondents, but no mean error is significantly different from zero. However the picture changes when the evaluation is based on revised 
Density forecast means
Corresponding analyses of the errors in the density forecast means give similar results to those presented for the reported point forecasts in Tables 3 and 4 , and do not merit the inclusion of an additional pair of tables. For inflation, the mean forecast error is negative for all but two of the 19 individual forecasters, although only one of these is now larger than −0.2 and significant at the 5% level. There are increases in RMSE as often as decreases between the two forecasts, although there is a slight decrease in the overall level, mostly as a result of the two forecasters with the largest RMSE values in Table 3 -individuals 1 and 12 -showing rather smaller RMSEs of their density forecast means. For GDP growth, we observe the same effects as above on comparing evaluations against real-time data with those using revised data, namely an increase in mean errors such that they are all positive in the latter case, and associated increases in RMSE. Once more, however, no mean error is significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
Horizon-specific individual biases
Although the preceding analyses show no forecast biases that merit further investigation, the assumption that the individual forecaster's bias, i φ in equation (1), is independent of the forecast horizon h may be unduly restrictive. We relax this assumption by considering the extended error decomposition in equation (2), and estimating horizon-specific individual biases. For each regular respondent we calculate ˆi h φ as in equation (6), and consider tests of their individual significance and tests of their equality over h.
For the inflation point forecast errors, we reject the null hypothesis of equality of forecast bias over horizon at the 5% level for four of our 19 regular respondents. These four all have two or three horizon-specific ˆi h φ coefficients significantly different from zero at this level, although for three of them the overall bias shown in Table 3 is not significant; the fourth case is individual 7. Individual 12 is a counterexample, with a significant overall bias, resulting from several significant biases at different horizons, and non-rejection of the null hypothesis of equality across horizons.
The GDP growth real-time data forecast errors show two individuals whose insignificant overall bias masks variation with horizon that is significant at the 5% level. But Once more these findings are masked by the absence of significant overall biases in Table 4 , but they represent a further manifestation of the difficulties discussed above. The impact of data revisions on forecast performance is greatest at short horizons because it is here that accurate initial conditions are of greatest importance; at longer horizons forecasts tend to return to trend.
A similar pattern of results is found for the density forecast means, for both variables.
The SEF average and the MPC's forecasts
By way of a summary, akin to the study by Casillas-Olvera and Bessler (2006), Table 3 .
Although the 19 regular respondents do not always enter the published survey average, which also includes other less regular respondents, this result supports the familiar advantage to be gained by forecast pooling. The same result does not hold for the GDP growth forecasts, Table 4 showing a few individual RMSEs smaller than that of the SEF average forecast in each case, again suggesting ambiguity over the forecasters' target measure.
Asymmetries in forecasters' loss functions
We return to the question raised at the end of Section 2 with the evidence of the point forecast errors analysed above, in the context of the generalised loss function proposed by Elliott et al. (2005) , which is [ ]
for integer p and 0 1 "can be interpreted as justifying biased forecasts by adjusting the loss function to make them optimal", as they say (2005, p.1113) . Given the ambiguity in the definition of GDP growth forecast errors, with respect to real-time or revised data, we study only the inflation forecasts.
Estimates of α are presented in Table 6 Table 3 , which rest on the standard squared error loss framework, and further investigation through other means seems warranted. The calculations reported in this section can be relatively sensitive to outliers, but the main case in which these are evident is that of individual 1, discussed below, who is not of major concern in this section.
Individual heterogeneity
The good performance of the SEF average forecast shown in Table 5 and the general unbiasedness of the regular respondents' individual forecasts masks considerable variation in their forecast performance. As seen in Table 3 , the RMSE of inflation point forecasts ranges from 0.30 to 0.57, while the corresponding ranges for GDP growth forecasts (Table 4) ..., φ φ as shown in the relevant columns of Table 3 and the upper and lower panels of Table 4 . The corresponding test statistics are 1.60, 0.55 and 0.32, respectively. The total number of forecasts entering the calculation is 1561 n = for inflation and 1322 n = for GDP growth, and the 5% critical value of the (18, ) F n distribution is 1.61. Thus the null hypothesis of equal mean forecast errors, or individual homogeneity in this respect, is not rejected, although the inflation forecast mean errors are very close to rejection at this level.
A test of individual heterogeneity with respect to variance is based on the variance of the idiosyncratic error ith ε defined in equation (1): the null hypothesis is that the variances 2 i ε σ are equal across individuals. From the estimates reported in Table 3 and the two panels   of Table 4 , we obtain test statistics of 5.96, 5.05 and 4.46, respectively. Comparison with the 1% critical value of (18, ) F n of 1.95 indicates highly significant individual heterogeneity with respect to forecast error variance for both variables.
Overwhelming rejections of individual homogeneity are reported by Davies and Lahiri (1999) for inflation forecasts in the US Survey of Professional Forecasters, the survey dataset that is most comparable to the SEF. Their individual analyses are based on the performance of 45 forecasters who responded more than 50% of the time, supplying forecasts one-to-four quarters ahead for up to 89 target dates (1969Q4-1991Q4) . Individual biases are much more prevalent than in our sample, with 12 of the 45 forecasters having mean errors significantly different from zero at the 5% level (or higher), whether preliminary or revised outcome data are used, and whether one quarter horizon forecasts or all forecasts together are considered. Individual homogeneity with respect to idiosyncratic error variance is strongly rejected. However their sample period is one of considerably different inflationary experience than ours, including as it does the "Great Inflation" of the 1970s, when there were well-documented forecast failures (McNees, 1979) . The significant individual biases are all cases of positive mean errors, that is, underpredictions of inflation. In contrast, RPIX inflation during our sample period was in the range 1.9-3.3%, as noted above. Nevertheless, the common finding of individual heterogeneity with respect to idiosyncratic error variance indicates that some respondents in both survey samples are better at forecasting than others.
Tests of efficiency
The rational expectation or efficient forecast of the outcome t A under squared error loss is its expected value conditional on information available at time t h − , hence the null hypothesis of forecast efficiency is written ( )
assuming that t h I − contains "all available" information. Standard tests of forecast efficiency then check the orthogonality of the forecast errors to variables which the researcher considers to be likely members of the forecast information set. If a variable is found which is correlated with the forecast error, and could thus have improved the forecast, then the rejection of the null hypothesis is conclusive. On the other hand, failure to reject efficiency may simply reflect the researcher's failure to find the information that the forecaster had overlooked. Since the information set includes past A, F and A F − , a simple test that is often used is to check the absence of autocorrelation of order h or more in the forecast errors.
Given the relative preponderance of forecasts at 9 h = in the SEF dataset and the low power of high-order autocorrelation tests, together with the double loss of degrees of freedom for autocorrelation coefficients caused by missing observations, we do not pursue this possibility.
To test the efficiency of the inflation forecasts, we consider four variables that are likely members of the information set: the latest available inflation outcome at the time the survey was carried out, the most recent forecast by the MPC, the most recent SEF average forecast, and the real-time output gap or inflationary pressure measure of Garratt, Lee, Mise and Shields (2007) . (We use the published average SEF forecast rather than the individual's own previous forecast because, again, missing observations cause a double loss of degrees of freedom.) We first test the admissibility of this instrument set in a multiple regression of the forecast on the four candidate variables. This gives significant regression results at the 5% level or (mostly) higher for 15 of the 19 regular respondents, from which we conclude that these variables are valid candidate variables for testing efficiency. Proceeding to a regression of the forecast errors on these variables, we find a significant regression result and hence a rejection of efficiency in three cases, namely individuals 1, 7 and 12, while 16 of the 19 regular respondents pass this test.
For the GDP growth forecasts, the longer publication delay in national accounts data implies that the latest observation on the outcome that can be included in t h I − is
In these circumstances we also include the monthly GDP estimate produced by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research as a candidate variable (Mitchell, Smith, Weale, Wright and Salazar, 2005) , together with the most recent MPC and SEF average forecasts, as in the case of inflation. The multiple regression of the forecast on these four candidate variables gives a significant regression result for 10 out of 19 individuals, which is less strong evidence in favour of these instruments than in the case of inflation, perhaps reflecting greater difficulties caused by data delays and the forecasters' treatment of potential revisions. Nevertheless, on turning to efficiency tests we find overwhelming evidence against the null hypothesis, with rejections for 16 individuals if errors are defined with respect to real-time data, and for all but one individual if errors are defined with respect to revised data. Among the candidate variables, the most recent MPC forecast has a strong positive correlation with many individual forecasts, and a strong negative correlation with the forecast error, leading to the rejection of efficiency; the MPC's own forecast fails this test.
This suggests that among individual respondents there is, unfortunately, too great a tendency to "follow my leader" in this respect. This is not a feature of the inflation forecasts.
Conclusion
This article provides a first evaluation of the forecasts of inflation and GDP growth obtained Access to the individual survey responses allows replication of the point forecast evaluations performed on several similar survey datasets by several authors. A distinguishing feature of the SEF, however, is that it also collects subjective probability assessments or density forecasts, in which respect its only existing counterpart is the long-established Survey of Professional Forecasters in the United States. This allows a dual evaluation, of the reported point forecasts and the alternative point forecasts implied by a measure of location of the density forecasts. As with the US data, differences between the two forecasts in the SEF can be interpreted as a tendency towards reporting point forecasts that represent "favourable" or optimistic outcomes, although an alternative interpretation of forecasters' behaviour in terms of asymmetric loss functions is preferred.
In tests of unbiasedness of the inflation and GDP growth forecasts, both the survey average and a subsample of individual forecasters present an overall picture of good performance. As is often remarked in discussions of the performance of the Monetary Policy
Committee over its first ten years, however, this was a relatively calm period for the UK economy that presented no serious problems to forecasters, in the form of major turning points, for example. Behind the general picture lies considerable individual heterogeneity,
shown not only by the failure of standard tests of equality of idiosyncratic error variances, but also by further evidence of different degrees of asymmetry in forecasters' loss functions. In the face of this individual heterogeneity, the good performance of the survey average forecasts of inflation is another example of the benefits of forecast pooling.
The inflation forecasts also perform well in tests of efficiency, whereas the GDP growth forecasts do not. This finding may be related to the familiar difficulty of measurement, with inaccurate real-time national accounts data and their subsequent extended revision process causing difficulties for forecast construction and evaluation. Data revisions substantially change the overall impression of the performance of forecasts of GDP growth at short horizons, as is also the experience of the Monetary Policy Committee.
Many questions remain to be explored in the context of the SEF dataset, replicating and extending an already large empirical literature on forecasting. Several of our findings prompt questions about the individual forecasters' methods and objectives, whose exploration would be worthwhile. Note to Tables 3-6: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
